Narrow Cause-Effect
The four kinds of cause, the two continuums, and Buddhism’s refutation of a “first cause”
བདུན་པ་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་ཆུང་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཡོད་དེ།
Seventh, presentation of narrow cause-effect.
“Establishing narrow cause-effect” is a particularly important topic within the small reasoning methods, because it bears directly on our actual practice. Whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, any system that establishes its own basis, path, and fruition must begin from an understanding of cause and effect. This topic helps us correctly understand and establish many important points of doctrine that follow later — such as the existence of past and future lives, the law of karma, the truth of cyclic existence, the Four Noble Truths, and the twelve links of dependent origination.
A fine-grained analysis of causation is in fact quite difficult. Later, we will study the “effect-reason” (a valid reason based on effect) in the study of reasons, along with Dharmakīrti’s detailed analysis of the effect-reason in the Pramāṇavārttika — only then will we come to a fuller and deeper understanding of the various issues surrounding causation. For now, we will establish only the most basic, correct understanding.
སྐྱེད་བྱེད། རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་ན་དངོས་རྒྱུ། བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ། ཉེར་ལེན། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྐྱེན་དང་བཞི།
That which is able to produce, is the definition of cause. Classified as four: direct cause, indirect cause, substantial cause, and cooperative condition.
“That which is able to produce” refers to the capacity to produce one’s own effect. In the presentation of established bases, we said that the definition of “entity” is “that which possesses a function,” and the “function” accepted in common by all tenet systems from Sautrāntika upward is precisely “the function of being able to produce one’s own effect.” Now, in saying that the definition of “cause” is “being able to produce,” the two discussions connect: this is exactly why “cause,” “impermanence,” and “entity” are equivalent in this sense.
Put simply: whatever is impermanent is pervaded by being a cause; whatever is an entity is pervaded by being a cause.
The four types of cause can be divided along two dimensions:
• By the dimension of time: direct cause and indirect cause;
• By the dimension of continuum: substantial cause and cooperative condition.
དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད། དངོས་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is able to directly produce, is the definition of direct cause.
བརྒྱུད་ནས་སྐྱེད་བྱེད། བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is able to indirectly produce, is the definition of indirect cause.
“That which is able to directly produce” means that, within a single continuum, there is nothing else interposed between cause and effect — the two adjoin one another immediately, in direct succession. If some other entity is interposed between cause and effect, the relationship becomes one of indirect cause and indirect effect.
More precisely: once the cause ceases, the effect arises immediately, with not even the shortest time-limit moment intervening — such a cause is a direct cause. For example, when a seed produces a sprout: the seed ceases and the sprout arises immediately, with nothing else interposed in between; therefore the seed is the direct cause of the sprout.
Conversely, if at least one time-limit moment intervenes between cause and effect, that cause is an indirect cause. The key point is simply whether or not something else is interposed in between — like train carriages: the first carriage and the second carriage are directly connected, in direct adjacency; the first carriage and the third carriage, with one carriage interposed between them, are only indirectly adjacent.
རང་གི་ཉེར་འབྲས་རང་གི་རིགས་རྒྱུན་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད། ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
The primary producer that produces its own substantial effect as its own categorical continuum, is the definition of substantial cause.
རང་གི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་རང་གི་རིགས་རྒྱུན་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྐྱེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
The primary producer that produces its own cooperative effect as its own non-categorical-continuum, is the definition of cooperative condition.
In this second division — substantial cause and cooperative condition — although “cooperative condition” is named a “condition,” it is nevertheless equivalent to “cause”: it is itself a cause, simply not called “cause” by name.
The fundamental distinction between substantial cause and cooperative condition lies in whether cause and effect belong to the same “categorical continuum.” The root text uses the term “categorical continuum,” while in everyday explanation we often say “substance-continuum.”
A “continuum” requires at least two moments in order to be posited at all, and is generally divided into two kinds: “substance-continuum” and “category-continuum.”
Substance-continuum: this refers to the continuity of the substance itself of an impermanent entity. If the substance of the earlier moment directly transforms into the substance of the later moment, the two belong to the same substance-continuum. For example, a gold earring melted down and remade into a gold nail — though its shape and name differ, the substance throughout is gold, so earring and nail belong to the same substance-continuum.
In addition, making the gold nail requires a mold; the mold itself does not turn into the nail, so mold and nail belong to different substance-continuums — the mold is therefore a cooperative condition of the nail.
Category-continuum: built on top of substance-continuum, this further takes into account the continuity of category (type). Within the same substance-continuum, if the earlier and later moments belong to the same category, they form the same category-continuum — for example, clay at an earlier moment and clay at a later moment belong to the same category-continuum. But once the clay becomes a clay vessel, the category has clearly changed, and it is no longer the same category-continuum.
Category-continuum and substance-continuum therefore stand in the following relationship, expressed through two pervasions rather than through a list of examples:
• If something is the same category-continuum, it is pervaded by being the same substance-continuum (as with clay at an earlier and a later moment).
• If something is the same substance-continuum, it is not pervaded by being the same category-continuum (as with the gold earring and gold nail, or the clay and the clay vessel).
Whether substantial cause or cooperative condition, both are necessary conditions for the arising of the effect — neither can be dispensed with.
Comparing the two definitions makes this clearer:
Substantial cause: with respect to its own substantial effect, on the substance-continuum to which it belongs, it is the primary and indispensable producer.
Cooperative condition: with respect to its own cooperative effect, on a substance-continuum that is not the same as its own, it is likewise the primary and indispensable producer — the only difference from the substantial cause being the added word “not,” i.e., cause and effect do not fall on the same substance-continuum.
For example, in a seed producing a sprout: the seed is the substantial cause, while sunlight, water, soil, and so on are the cooperative conditions — neither can be dispensed with. Among these, the seed is the “uncommon cause” (specific and exclusive to that effect), while sunlight, water, and the like are “common causes” (needed by every kind of seed, shared in common).
Likewise, within the law of karma: the karma created in a past life is the substantial cause of this life’s fruition, and is an uncommon cause. Precisely because the karma each person created in past lives differs, the fruition of this life differs immensely from person to person. This is the fundamental reason we must take karma seriously and be careful in what we adopt and discard, in terms of virtue and non-virtue.
This is also why we must keep the precepts strictly: the seeds of affliction are the substantial cause of manifest affliction, but manifest affliction still requires various cooperative conditions. If one can strictly keep the precepts, so that the cooperative conditions are not complete, the affliction cannot manifest — this is the principle by which keeping precepts prevents afflictions from arising.
To summarize the features of the four types of cause:
• 1. Direct cause: there is no time interval whatsoever between it and its own direct effect.
• 2. Indirect cause: there is necessarily a time interval between it and its own indirect effect.
• 3. Substantial cause: it and its own substantial effect must be on the same substance-continuum.
• 4. Cooperative condition: it and its own cooperative effect must not be on the same substance-continuum.
བསྐྱེད་བྱ། འབྲས་བུའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is produced, is the definition of effect.
དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་འབྲས། བརྒྱུད་འབྲས། ཉེར་འབྲས། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་དང་བཞི།
Classified as four: direct effect, indirect effect, substantial effect, cooperative effect.
དངོས་སུ་བསྐྱེད་བྱ། དངོས་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is directly produced, is the definition of direct effect.
བརྒྱུད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་བྱ། བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is indirectly produced, is the definition of indirect effect.
རང་གི་ཉེར་འབྲས་རང་གི་རིགས་རྒྱུན་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་བསྐྱེད་བྱ། ཉེར་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is primarily produced while itself being the substantial effect and categorical continuum, is the definition of substantial effect.
རང་གི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་རང་གི་རིགས་རྒྱུན་མ་ཡིན་པ་གཙོ་བོར་བསྐྱེད་བྱ། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which is primarily produced while itself being the cooperative effect and non-categorical-continuum, is the definition of cooperative effect.
The four types of effect correspond exactly to the four types of cause: by the dimension of time, direct effect and indirect effect; by the dimension of continuum, substantial effect and cooperative effect. The same principle applies: if cause and effect are on the same substance-continuum, this is the relation of substantial cause and substantial effect; if not on the same substance-continuum, it is the relation of cooperative condition and cooperative effect.
Cause and effect are mutually dependent: that which produces is the cause; that which is produced is the effect. The effect is an impermanent entity; therefore “that which is produced,” “cause,” “effect,” “condition,” “impermanence,” and “entity” are all equivalent in this sense — this is an important conclusion to remember.
དེའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དངོས་རྒྱུ། དེའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ།
That which arose immediately before it, is direct cause; that which arose prior to that which arose immediately before it, is indirect cause.
དེའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དངོས་འབྲས། དེའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཡིན་ལ།
That which is produced immediately after it, is direct effect. That which is produced after that which is produced immediately after it, is indirect effect.
A further explanation: in “that which arose immediately before it, is direct cause,” “it” refers to some effect, and “that which arose immediately before” is equivalent to “direct cause.” If one posits its indirect cause, that is “that which arose prior to that which arose immediately before it” — the indirect effect and the indirect cause here have one intervening “that which arose immediately before” standing between them.
དེས་དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་ལ་རིགས་འགྲེ་སྟེ་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །
Therefore, all entities follow the same pattern.
All entities can be understood by extending this same principle of cause and effect.
For example: in this life we obtain a human body → tracing backward, that was preceded by being a young adult → before that, an infant → before that, a fetus → before that, a fertilized egg → and tracing further back still, one arrives at a past life... Through this chain of cause and effect, one can reason to the existence of past and future lives.
In general, whatever is an entity is pervaded by having something that arose before it (this entity can serve as an effect) and something that will arise after it (this entity can serve as a cause). However, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika hold that there is an exception: when an Arhat with remainder enters nirvana without remainder, the continuum of consciousness ceases completely, with no substantial effect — and so it, too, is no longer a substantial cause. This is the basis for the position that “whatever is impermanent is not pervaded by being a substantial cause.”
(Regarding the special nature of the continuum of sound, and the refutation of a “first cause,” we will not go into full detail here given considerations of scope and focus — but the core conclusion is: Buddhism does not accept any “first cause”; all entities arise in dependence on causes and conditions, and tracing backward, there is no beginning.)
Analysis of the “First Cause”
Every entity has its own substantial cause and its own substantial effect. Tracing backward in particular, one can trace all the way to beginninglessness. Many people do not understand the meaning of “beginningless.” Western philosophy, too, has explored the notion of a “first cause,” with differing explanations:
Some schools of ancient Indian philosophy explain that Maheśvara is the first cause, having created the whole universe; certain ancient Chinese accounts hold that it was Pangu who opened up heaven and earth — that at the very beginning there was an undifferentiated chaos in which heaven and earth were not yet separated, with no concept of space or time, and only once the clear and the turbid separated into heaven and earth did space and time come to exist, at which point one could locate the very first cause.
Buddhism directly refutes the notion of a first cause: one may ask, is the first cause a permanent phenomenon or an impermanent one? If the first cause is said to be permanent, then whatever is permanent is pervaded by having no moment-to-moment arising and ceasing; if the first cause has nothing arising after it, then it is not a cause at all, let alone a first cause. If the first cause is said to be impermanent, then whatever is impermanent is pervaded by being an effect, by being something produced — in which case there would be something arising before it on its own substance-continuum, and so it would not be “first” as a cause either.
These are only brief debates; the full debates are far more extensive. For now, we are simply establishing some of the basic concepts of our own system.
Summary
The topic of “narrow cause-effect” carries particular significance for establishing the existence of past and future lives. Only once past and future lives are established can one go on to establish karma and the workings of the six realms of cyclic existence; once karma and cyclic existence are established, one can truly recognize the various sufferings of saṃsāra; and it is precisely by seeing these sufferings of saṃsāra that genuine renunciation arises, leading one to seek the path and the fruit of liberation. If one does not even accept the existence of past and future lives — holding that “when a person dies, it is like a lamp going out, and nothing remains” — then the study of the Dharma loses its most fundamental motivation, becoming merely a matter of “asking the buddhas and bodhisattvas to bless this life to go a little better,” which is not the true aim of Buddhism.
The previous post in this series:
To believe in the existence of past and future lives, one needs to understand causality in the narrow sense, as well as impermanence.
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