General and Particular
Class, Meaning, and Collection — The Three Types of General and the Rules of Their Relation
དྲུག་པ་སི་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཡོད་དེ།
Sixth, the presentation of general and particular.
རང་གི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རེས་སུ་འགྱོ་བའི་ཆོས། སིའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
A dharma which encompasses its manifestations, is the definition of general.
General serves as a definiendum, and its definition is “a dharma which encompasses its manifestations.” The word “manifestations” here refers to the concrete instances through which a general reveals itself — the particulars that make an abstract general perceptible and known. So the definition can also be read as: a general is a dharma whose nature is to encompass and be made clear through its own instances.
What does this mean in practice? A general is by nature abstract and difficult to grasp directly. Take “form” as an example: the concept of form on its own is broad and hard to pin down. But when one encounters a concrete instance — a pot, a pillar, a table — the abstract concept of form suddenly becomes clear. The table can be directly known through a root consciousness; it is a definite, particular thing. Through these concrete instances, the meaning of “form” becomes clear. This is what it means for a general to “encompass its manifestations” — a general must follow along with its own particulars in order to make itself known.
རང་གི་རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཅན་གི་ཆོས། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།
A dharma that has its class, is the definition of particular.
The word “has” in “has its class” is a specific technical usage in this context. For example, impermanence is divided into form, cognition, and non-associated formation. Form possesses impermanence as its “class” — form is something that “has a class.” Form is therefore the particular, and impermanence is its general.
General and particular are relative concepts — like cause and effect, or probandum and proof, each side is defined in relation to the other. If B is the general, then A is the particular if and only if A possesses B. The direction matters: it is the particular that possesses the general, not the other way around. Impermanence, cognition, and non-associated formation each possess their own general, “impermanence” — they are therefore “that which has a class,” i.e., particulars.
The structure of “X and that which has X” appears throughout the curriculum: for example, “part and that which has parts” — that which has parts is the general, such as a pot; a spout is a part of the pot, hence a particular. Likewise: particular is “that which has a class,” and general is “the class.” The order cannot be reversed.
Both definitions include the word “dharma” — this is to exclude non-dharmas. Without it, the definitions would inadvertently extend to non-dharmas. For example: a rabbit’s horn is neither impermanent nor permanent. A rabbit’s horn cannot serve as a particular, and non-impermanence or non-permanence cannot serve as its general — because a rabbit’s horn is not a dharma. Conversely, on the side of the general: only-permanent conforms to space, permanence, and other dharmas — but only-permanent is itself a non-dharma, and therefore cannot be the general of space.
སི་བློས་གཟུང་ཚུལ་ཤེས་པའི་ཆེད་དུ་སྒྲས་བརྱོད་རིགས་ཀི་སྱོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན། རིགས་སི། དོན་སི། ཚོགས་སི་དང་གསུམ།
In order to understand how the cognizance apprehends generals, they are classified into three through the gate of sound: class general, meaning general, collection general.
The three types of general are established here for a specific purpose: “in order to understand how cognition apprehends generals.” This is classification through the gate of sound — meaning that the three types are named and expressed as such, but this does not mean that all three fully satisfy the definition of general stated above.
When classifying through the gate of the nature of the thing itself, every member of the category must satisfy the definition. But classification through the gate of sound means that inclusion is based on naming and expression — a term carries the label “general” in its name and is therefore included, even if it does not satisfy the definition of general proper.
Among the three: only class general genuinely satisfies the definition of general. Why is it called “class” general? Because in the definition of particular — “a dharma that has its class” — the word “class” appears, and it is precisely this “class” that represents the concept of general. So class general feels naturally consistent with what came before. Meaning general and collection general, by contrast, both carry the word “general” in their names — that is the “sound” that qualifies them for inclusion here — but neither satisfies the definition of general as “a dharma which encompasses its manifestations.”
དང་པོ་དང་སི་དོན་གཅིག
The first is equivalent to general.
“The first” refers to class general. Class general and general are synonymous — class general can be directly explained as “a dharma which encompasses its manifestations,” the definition of general. Meaning general and collection general, by contrast, are not synonymous with general: strictly speaking, they also have their own particulars and in that sense are also generals, but their definitions do not align with the definition of general proper, and so they are not general in the full sense.
བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་བཞིན་དུ་བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་སྣང་བའི་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་ཀི་ཆ། བུམ་པའི་དོན་སིའི་མཚན་ཉིད། དཔེར་ན། བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་སྣང་བ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །
The super-imposition aspect that, while not a vase, is appeared as like a pot on a conceptualizer apprehending a pot, is the definition of the meaning-general of pot. For example, the appearance of a pot on the conceptualizer apprehending a pot.
Meaning general is explained through the specific example of “the meaning general of pot.” Its definition is: “the super-imposition aspect that, while not a pot, appears as like a pot on a conceptualizer apprehending a pot.” The word “like” here means “not actually” — on the conceptual cognition apprehending a pot, there is an appearance that is not a pot but resembles one. This super-imposition aspect is not a real pot but presents itself as though it were.
Meaning general is a permanent dharma — it is the aspect super-imposed by a conceptual cognition. The meaning general of pot is permanent. Since whatever is permanent is pervaded by not being impermanent, and whatever is not impermanent is pervaded by not being a pot, the meaning general of pot clearly cannot be a pot — yet it resembles a pot, presenting itself in the likeness of one. It is an appearance, a super-imposition aspect.
A common misunderstanding is to think of the meaning general of pot as a mental image — “when I close my eyes, the image of a pot that appears is the meaning general of pot.” But such an image has shape and color; it is a form, an impermanent dharma. Since it is impermanent it cannot be permanent, and therefore cannot be a meaning general. The meaning general is the aspect super-imposed by a conceptual cognition — it is an abstracted concept, not a sensory image.
An important point to understand: when a conceptual cognition apprehends an impermanent dharma, it does not directly and clearly present that impermanent dharma to itself. It only clearly presents the meaning general of that dharma — and that meaning general is permanent, not impermanent.
“The appearance of a pot on the conceptualizer apprehending a pot” is the example given for the meaning general of pot. More precisely, following the Tibetan: it is not “the appearance of a pot” but rather “the pot as it appears” — the aspect of pot that presents itself within that cognition. That appearing aspect is the meaning general of pot. Since the meaning general is a permanent dharma, and appearance itself can be either permanent or impermanent, appearance as such is a permanent dharma.
ཆ་ཤས་དུ་མ་འདུས་པའི་གཟུགས་རགས་པ། ཚོགས་སིའི་མཚན་ཉིད། དཔེར་ན། ཀ་བུམ་སོགས་གཟུགས་རགས་པ་རྣམས་ལྟ་བུའོ། །
A coarse form that is composed of many parts, is the definition of collection general. For example, coarse forms like pot, pillar etc.
Collection general is “coarse form composed of many parts” — emphasis is on coarse form. Fine form is excluded. According to the Sautrāntika school, fine form includes partless particles — the smallest unit obtained by dividing a form down to the point where it can no longer be divided and has no discernible sides or directions. A coarse form, when cut, reveals east, south, west, north, above, and below — it has spatial extent. A partless particle has no such sides and is therefore the smallest possible unit. Partless particles are clearly not coarse form, since they are not composed of many parts.
The uncommon empowering condition of root consciousness is inner form — inner form is also fine form, not coarse form. Coarse form is that which can be directly known by root consciousness.
ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་སི་ཡིན་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཁྱོད་ཀི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར།
Knowable dharmin, is a general of entity, because entity is a particular of such.
A debate now begins. In the syllogism, the pronoun “such” refers to “knowable.”
Challenger: Knowable dharmin, is a general of entity.
Defender: Why?
Challenger: Because entity is a particular of knowable.
Defender: Accepted.
དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་འགྲོ་ཚུལ་བྱོས།
Entity dharmin, it would not be a particular of knowable. Present the standard of particular!
The challenger now attacks from the opposite direction in order to dislodge the defender’s accepted thesis.
Challenger: Entity dharmin, it would follow that entity is not a particular of knowable. Present the standard of particular!
Asking the opponent to present their standard is a common move in debate. If the two sides are operating from different rules, they cannot engage at the same point. By demanding the standard, the challenger forces the defender to make their own criteria explicit.
དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན། ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕིར། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
Entity dharmin, this would be a particular of knowable, because 1) this is knowable; 2) this and knowable are one-essence-linked; 3) there are many common locuses that are not this, definiendum is also that, definition is also that.
The challenger now presents the three rules for being a particular, applied to entity as a particular of knowable:
Rule 1: Entity is knowable.
Entity is itself a knowable — this is uncontroversial.
Rule 2: Entity and knowable stand in a same-nature relation.
Note that “entity and knowable stand in a same-nature relation” and “knowable and entity stand in a same-nature relation” are not the same statement. The order here is “entity and knowable stand in a same-nature relation” — meaning entity is the relatum and knowable is the locus of relation. Entity is that which relates to knowable; knowable is that to which entity relates. This is the direction: particular relates to general, not general to particular. The order cannot be reversed.
Supplementary Note: Relation of Identity and Causal Relation
“Same-nature” means having the same nature or essence. Two dharmas share the same nature when they cannot be distinguished from one another by a direct cognition — specifically, by a root consciousness. If a root consciousness can distinguish two dharmas, they are of distinct natures.
For example: can a root consciousness distinguish pot from form? No — a pot satisfies all the characteristics of form; one cannot place pot on the left and form on the right and separate them. Pot and form are therefore same-nature — they stand in a same-nature relation.
By contrast, pot and pillar are of distinct natures. A non-conceptual cognition — particularly a root consciousness — can clearly distinguish pot from pillar: pot on the left, pillar on the right, with no connection between them.
A general rule: whenever at least one of two dharmas is permanent, they are necessarily same-nature, standing in a same-nature relation. All permanent dharmas share the same nature. Moreover, any permanent dharma and any impermanent dharma also stand in a same-nature relation — because wherever a permanent dharma is involved, root consciousness cannot present it, and therefore cannot distinguish it from an impermanent dharma.
“Relation” means that the two are connected: the relatum relates to the locus of relation, and if the locus of relation is eliminated, the relatum is eliminated along with it — the relatum depends entirely on the locus of relation. Note: both must be dharmas, and they must be distinct. If something is the same dharma as itself, eliminating it eliminates itself — that is not a relation. And if something is a non-dharma, it does not exist to begin with, so the question of whether it survives the elimination of something else does not arise.
Relation divides into two types:
Same-nature relation: For example, pot and form : if form is eliminated, pot cannot exist — they stand in same-nature relation. Impermanence and knowable: wherever knowable is involved, the two are same-nature — because knowable is a permanent dharma. If knowable is eliminated, impermanence cannot exist — so they too stand in same-nature relation.
Causal relation: The counterpart to same-nature relation is causal relation (sometimes called production relation). Cause and effect cannot coexist simultaneously — the cause ceases and then the effect arises. The effect is produced from the cause. Therefore, whatever stands in causal relation is a cause-effect pair.
Rule 3: There exist many common locuses that are not entity but are knowable — definiendum is one such, and definition is also one such.
“There exist many” means that many such things exist. “Not entity” means not being an entity. “Also being knowable” means satisfying the definition of knowable. “Common locus” means there must be things that are simultaneously non-entity and knowable.
To illustrate with another example — impermanence as a particular of knowable:
• Impermanence is knowable.
• Impermanence and knowable stand in a same-nature relation — they are distinct yet of the same nature; eliminating knowable eliminates impermanence.
• For the third rule: “not impermanence” here means non-impermanence. There must be a common locus of non-impermanence and knowable — for example, space is both non-impermanent and knowable. The text also gives definiendum and definition as examples — both are non-impermanent and knowable. All three rules are satisfied, so impermanence is a particular of knowable.
Now consider established base as a potential particular of knowable:
• Established base is knowable.
• Established base and knowable stand in a same-nature relation — if knowable is eliminated, established base cannot exist; they are distinct yet of the same nature.
• But established base and knowable are synonymous — whatever is non-established-base is necessarily non-knowable. There is nothing that is both non-established-base and knowable. The third rule fails. Therefore established base is not a particular of knowable.
Through this debate the three rules for establishing the general-particular relation are made precise. The rules apply to any concrete pair standing in the general-particular relation:
• The particular is the general — they stand in an instance relation.
• The particular and general stand in a same-nature relation; eliminating the general eliminates the particular; the two must also be distinct dharmas.
• At least one common locus must exist that is not the particular yet is the general.
A challenging case worth considering: the cause of impermanence and its relation to impermanence.
Rule 1: Is the cause of impermanence itself impermanent? If not, it would have to be permanent — but a permanent dharma cannot stand in a causal relation. So the cause of impermanence must be impermanent. Rule 1 is satisfied.
Rule 2: Does “the cause of impermanence is impermanent” entail that the cause of impermanence and impermanence stand in a same-nature relation? No — the cause of impermanence and impermanence stand in a causal relation, which is a causal relation, not a same-nature relation. In a causal relation the two are necessarily of distinct natures. Same-nature relation requires the two to share the same nature. Rule 2 is not satisfied.
Rule 3: There are many dharmas that are not the cause of impermanence yet are impermanent — for example, pot and pillar. Note that this is an abstract formulation: it does not mean “why can’t pot produce its own impermanent effect?” — here we are speaking of impermanence itself as an abstract dharma.
འགྲོ་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཚང་མ་ཚང་གི་སྒོ་ནས་སི་བྱེ་བྲག་དང། སིའི་སི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་སོགས་གཉིས་གསུམ་མཐའ་ཡས་པ་སྦྱར་དགོས་སོ། །
The method of determining whether or not these three rules apply completely must be used across the general of the general, the particular of the particular, and so on, in twofold, threefold, and infinite levels.
“Whether or not these three rules apply completely” — the three rules just established must all be present; none can be missing. Using these three rules, one can determine any general-particular relationship, and also the general of a general, and the particular of a particular.
The instruction is to find a general-particular pair, then treat the particular itself as a general and find its particular — continuing downward until reaching an only-particular; or treat the general as a particular of something above it — continuing upward until reaching an only-general.
“General of the general, particular of the particular”: for example, consider form and impermanence. Form is impermanent; form and impermanence stand in a same-nature relation; there are many non-forms that are impermanent, such as cognition — so form is a particular of impermanence. The “general of the general” means: impermanence is a particular of knowable, and knowable is the general of impermanence — knowable is the general of impermanence’s general. The “particular of the particular” means: form has its own particulars — pot and pillar are particulars of form. All of these are established through the same three rules, and can be extended to two, three, or infinitely many levels.
Two special cases:
Only-general:
Knowable is an only-general — it cannot serve as a particular of any other dharma. For knowable to be a particular of some dharma, the third rule would require the existence of something that is not knowable yet is that dharma — that is, a common locus of non-knowable and some other dharma. But any such common locus would have to be an existing dharma, and all existing dharmas are knowable. No non-knowable common locus can exist. Therefore knowable cannot be a particular of anything — it can only be a general. Likewise, non-self is also an only-general.
Only-particular:
The pair pot-and-pillar is an only-particular — it cannot serve as a general of any other dharma. This is because the pair pot-and-pillar is a non-instantiable knowable: no dharma is the pair pot-and-pillar. The first rule would require some dharma to be the pair pot-and-pillar — but none exists. Rule 1 fails immediately. The pair pot-and-pillar can, however, serve as a particular: it is a particular of form, a particular of impermanence, and a particular of knowable.
As a further exercise, consider the relationships among the three types of general introduced earlier — collection general and meaning general, collection general and class general, class general and meaning general — and determine how many of the four logical cases apply to each pair. Additionally, for any general-particular pair, practice finding its own instances, its own particulars, and determining whether it functions as a general or a particular. This kind of broad application greatly deepens understanding of the general-particular relation and sharpens one’s overall reasoning ability.
The previous post in this series:
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The detail that stopped me: conceptual cognition never apprehends the impermanent dharma directly. It only presents the meaning general. The superimposed aspect. Permanent. Standing in for the pot without being the pot.
That has a strange echo in predictive coding. The brain doesn't process raw sensory data directly. It maintains a generative model and updates it when predictions fail. What reaches consciousness is not the world but the model's best guess.
Different frameworks. Different centuries. But both seem to be describing the same gap: between the world-as-it-is and the world-as-cognition-encounters-it.
What I'm curious about: the post says meaning general is not a mental image (because images are impermanent forms). So what exactly is it? An abstraction? A type rather than a token? It sounds almost like the gap between an algorithm and any particular run of the algorithm.
Is the gap between meaning general and its instances something Gelug epistemology treats as a problem to be resolved? Or is the gap itself what makes conceptual cognition possible?