Established Base - 07 : What Makes a Definition a Definition?
Exploring the Logic of Definiendum and Definition in Buddhist Epistemology
Today we continue our study of Collected Topics. In this installment, we will explore two central concepts: definition (mtshan nyid) and definiendum (mtshan gzhi), along with the relatively introductory distinction between substantial existence and imputed existence that underlies them. While these topics belong to the foundational layer of both this textbook and the broader Buddhist curriculum, they in fact carry profound implications that touch on something absolutely central to the Dharma. For now, however, we are not yet in a position to fully unpack them — that will have to wait until we reach Madhyamaka, where they will receive the serious treatment they deserve.
བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ། མཚོན་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Comprising the complete three imputed existent dharmas is the definition of definiendum.
The definiendum itself is also a definiendum and thus has its own corresponding definition. “Comprising the complete three imputed existent dharmas” is the definition established for the definiendum: when determining whether a given dharma qualifies as a definiendum, one need only examine whether it satisfies the three imputed existent dharmas.
རང་མཚོན་བྱ་ཡིན་པ། ཆོས་གཞན་གྱི་མཚོན་བྱ་མི་བྱེད་པ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་གསུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ལ་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡོད་དེ། མཚན་གཞིའི་སྟེང་དུ་བློ་ཡུལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
The three—”(1) itself is a definiendum; (2) does not act as the definiendum of other dharmas; (3) is established on a definition”—as the dharmin: there is a reason for calling these “the three imputed existent dharmas,” because their establishment as objects of cognition on the instance depends upon verbal convention.
The three dharmas within the “three imputed existent dharmas” are explained as follows.
The first, “itself is a definiendum,” excludes non-definienda. Some dharmas are non-definienda yet may appear to satisfy the second and third conditions. For example, momentariness is itself a definition rather than a definiendum. While “momentariness” does not act as the definiendum of any dharma other than impermanence (satisfying the second condition) and can be established upon the definition “suitable to be form” (satisfying the third condition,) since “suitable to be form” accords with the characteristic of momentariness, “momentariness” itself is not a definiendum and thus fails the first condition, and is thereby excluded.
The second, “does not act as the definiendum of other dharmas,” requires that a definiendum correspond exclusively to its own definition. Beyond its own definition, it must not serve as the definiendum for any other dharma whatsoever. The two must satisfy a one-to-one correspondence.
The third, “is established on a definition,” denotes a relation of dependence: it is by being established upon a given definition that something becomes a definiendum.
“The three items as dharmin: there is a reason for calling them the three imputed existent dharmas, because they are established as objects of cognition on the instance and must depend upon verbal convention.” This passage explains the “imputed existence” in the phrase “the three imputed existent dharmas.” Something is imputed existent because it becomes a definiendum only after a verbal convention—a name—has been assigned to it; that is, a definiendum must borrow a verbal convention in order to be established, and is therefore imputed existent.
རྫས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Comprising the complete three substantial existent dharmas is the definition of definition.
A definition is itself also a definiendum and has a unique corresponding definition—namely, “comprising the complete three substantial existent dharmas.”
རང་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། ཆོས་གཞན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་མི་བྱེད་པ། མཚོན་བྱའི་སྟེང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་གསུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྫས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཡོད་དེ། བློ་ཡུལ་དུ་ཤར་བ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
The three—”(1) itself is a definition; (2) does not act as the definition of other dharmas; (3) is established on a definiendum”—as the dharmin: there is a reason for calling these “the three substantial existent dharmas,” because they arise as objects of cognition without depending upon verbal convention.
The three dharmas within the “three substantial existent dharmas” are explained as follows.
The first, “itself is a definition,” means that it is itself a definition with its own corresponding definiendum—for example, the definition “momentariness” corresponds to the definiendum “impermanence.” All instances of a definition are substantial existents; their existence does not depend upon verbal convention to be established. Although we use language to describe them, this is solely for communicative purposes and is not what brings them into being.
The second, “does not act as the definition of other dharmas,” excludes one-to-many relations. It is not possible for one definition to correspond to multiple definienda.
The third, “is established on a definiendum,” reflects a relation of mutual dependence: if one is a definiendum, one is established by depending upon a definition; if one is a definition, one is established by depending upon a definiendum. The two are mutually co-dependent.
“There is a reason for calling these the three substantial existent dharmas, because they arise as objects of cognition without depending upon verbal convention.” These three dharmas are substantial existents because a definition itself does not require the power of verbal convention in order to be established.
At the level of the Sautrantika following scripture and above, substantial existence and imputed existence are generally understood as follows: a dharma that must depend upon another in order to be established is imputed existent—as a definiendum depends upon verbal convention to be established; a dharma that can be established through itself without depending on something other is substantial existent—as a definition does not depend upon verbal convention to be established.
Although the two are mutually co-dependent, they are not symmetrical in the order of cognition. From the perspective of establishment, the third dharma within both the three imputed existent dharmas and the three substantial existent dharmas follows the same rule—each is established by depending upon the other. However, they differ in the sequential order of establishment and epistemic access: before one can cognize a definiendum, one must first cognize its definition.
བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་མ་ཚང་བ། མཚོན་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Not comprising the complete three imputed existent dharmas is the definition of non-definiendum.
“Not comprising the complete three imputed existent dharmas” means that failing to satisfy even one of the three imputed existent dharmas is sufficient to disqualify something from being established as a definiendum, rendering it a non-definiendum. All three conditions must be satisfied for the set to be complete. Hence, not comprising the three imputed existent dharmas is the definition of non-definiendum.
རྫས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ། མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Not comprising the complete three substantial existent dharmas is the definition of non-definition.
By the same principle, “not comprising the complete three substantial existent dharmas” is the definition of non-definition.
ལྟོ་ལྡིར་ཞབས་ཞུམ་ཆུ་སྐྱོར་གྱི་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ། བུམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which has a bulging body and a flat base, and is capable of holding water, is the definition of a vase.
“Vase” is a definiendum with its own definition. The intension of “vase”—having a bulging body and a flat base and being capable of holding water—is established as the definition of a vase.
གདུང་འདེགས་ཀྱི་དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ། ཀ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which has the function of supporting beams is the definition of a pillar.
By the same principle, “that which has the function of supporting beams” is the definition of a pillar.
ཡལ་ག་ལོ་འདབ་དང་ལྡན་པ། ཤིང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།
That which has branches and leaves is the definition of a tree.
“That which has branches and leaves” is the definition of a tree. Branches and leaves are themselves parts of a tree, yet each individual branch or leaf also qualifies as a tree, since it satisfies the definition “that which has branches and leaves.”
རང་གི་ཕུང་པོ་ལྔ་པོ་གང་རུང་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་སྐེས་བུ།
The being imputed in dependence upon any one of its own five aggregates is the definition of a pudgala.
The five aggregates are the aggregate of form, the aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of discerment, the aggregate of formations, and the aggregate of consciousness. “Any one of the five aggregates” means that the pudgala can be imputed upon any single one among them. “Imputed” signifies dependence upon other dharmas: the pudgala is established by being imputed in dependence upon any one of the five aggregates.
Beings in the desire realm and form realm possess all five aggregates, whereas beings in the formless realm lack the aggregate of form and are imputed solely upon the remaining four aggregates. Thus, by being imputed in dependence upon any one of the five aggregates, the pudgala can encompass all three realms.
ཚ་ཞིང་སྲེག་པ། མེའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Hot and burning is the definition of fire.
The definition of fire consists of two characteristics: “hot” and “burning.” Heat alone does not necessarily indicate fire—warmth, for instance, is hot without being fire—but burning necessarily entails fire. Therefore, both heat and burning together constitute the definition of fire.
སྲ་ཞིང་འཐས་པ། སའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Solid and obstructive is the definition of earth.
The definition of earth consists of two characteristics: “obstructive” and “solid”. “Obstructive” denotes hardness of the interior; “solid” denotes hardness of the exterior. Together they constitute the definition of earth.
བརླན་ཞིང་གཤེར་བ། ཆུའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Flowing and wet is the definition of water.
The definition of water consists of two characteristics: “wet” and “moist”. “Wet” denotes the sensation of dampness upon contact; “moist” denotes a cohesive or binding quality. Together they constitute the definition of water.
ཡང་ཞིང་གཡོ་བ། རླུང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Light and drifting is the definition of wind.
The definition of wind consists of two characteristics: “light” and “drifting”. “Light” refers to lightness of weight—a static property; “drifting” refers to movement—a dynamic property.
ཐོགས་རེག་བཀག་པའི་ཆ། ནམ་མཁའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
The mere exclusion of obstruction and physical contact is the definition of empty space.
Empty space is defined as the mere exclusion of obstruction and physical contact. “Obstruction” does not require actual contact but denotes the capacity to impede; “physical contact” refers to direct contact. Both are excluded. This exclusion does not further establish any positive dharma and hence empty space is a non-implicative negation and a permanent dharma. One must distinguish between empty space and spatial extension: the interior of an empty vase also lacks obstruction and contact, but what is present therein is spatial extension—a non-associated formation and an impermanent dharma—which is distinct from empty space itself.
ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་འགྲོ་ཚུལ་ཚང་བའི་ཕྱིར།
“That which is established by measure” dharmin, is the definition of established base, because it fully meets the criteria of the definition of established base.
འགྲོ་ཚུལ་བྱོས། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་ལ་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
State the criteria! Because for an established base to be determined by measure, it must be preceded by the measure of “that which is established by measure.”
This passage presents a formal debate. The opponent asserts: “’That which is established by measure’ dharmin is the definition of established base, because it fully meets the criteria of the definition of established base.” The proponent replies: “State the criteria!” The opponent then responds: “Because before determining the definiendum ‘established base’ by measure, one must first determine ‘that which is established by measure’ by measure.” The point is that before establishing a definiendum by measure, one must first cognize its definition by measure. Here, “established base” is the definiendum and “that which is established by measure” is its definition; therefore, before cognizing the definiendum “established base,” one must first cognize the definition “that which is established by measure.”
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I understand the following content：
“Obstructive” denotes hardness of the interior;
“solid” denotes hardness of the exterior.
“moist” denotes a cohesive or binding quality.
The path to profound emptiness begins with learning these definiendum and definition🙏🙏🙏