Established Base - 06 : What Makes Something Virtuous?
A rigorous Buddhist framework for classifying moral phenomena.
In this episode we continue studying the classifications of knowable. In principle, knowable could be classified in infinitely many ways — however, the classifications found in Buddhism each carry a specific intent: to help practitioners more easily enter into the Dharma in their future practice and thereby obtain tremendous benefit.
To expand on this point: many people doubt that the Buddha possessed omniscience. They argue that if he truly knew everything, why didn’t the scriptures teach us computer science, rocket technology, or quantum physics? The answer is that these subjects simply fall outside the scope of the Buddha’s teaching purpose — they cannot bring sentient beings to liberation.
ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་དུ་མ་ཡོད་དེ། དགེ་མ་དགེ་ལུང་མ་བསྟན་གསུམ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་གཉིས། གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་གཉིས། མཚོན་བྱ་དང་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་རྣམས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།།
Furthermore, there are various ways to classify knowable. These include: (1) classified as three — virtuousness, non-virtuousness, and indeterminacy; (2) classified as two — instantiable knowable and uninstantiable knowable; (3) classified as two — oneness and distinctiveness; (4) classified as two — definiendum and definition.
The three classifications of virtuousness, non-virtuousness, and indeterminacy; instantiable and uninstantiable knowable; and oneness and distinctiveness are classifications with a fixed number. The classification of definiendum and definition, however, is not a fixed-number classification, because the positing of definienda and definitions is connected to the basis, path, and fruition of practice. In everyday life, many things have only a general name and meaning and have not been strictly posited as a definiendum or definition.
ལུང་དུ་བསྟན་པ་གང་ཞིག བདེ་བ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་སུ་གནས་པ། དགེ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Presented in scriptural teachings, and abiding in the type of being able to produce well-being, is the definition of virtuousness.
The definition of virtuousness requires two conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. First, it must be “presented in scriptural teachings” — the specific karmic fruits of virtue, non-virtue, and similar phenomena belong to the extremely hidden scope, which cannot be fully known by ordinary beings through their own powers or through direct perception. Therefore, we can only rely on what has been “presented in scripture” — that is, taught directly by the Buddha — to confirm their validity. Second, it must “abide in the type of being able to produce well-being” — as a virtuous action operating as a cause, it has the capacity to give rise to happy results, and thus falls within the category of what is “able to produce well-being.” Note that “abides in the type of” refers to the capacity to produce well-being, not the certainty of producing it: the seed of a virtuous action may be destroyed by subsequent hatred or other afflictions, preventing the fruit from arising; yet because the action inherently possesses this capacity, it still belongs to the category of virtuousness.
ལུང་དུ་བསྟན་པ་གང་ཞིག སྡུག་བསྔལ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་སུ་གནས་པ། མི་དགེ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Presented in scriptural teachings, and abiding in the type of being able to produce suffering, is the definition of non-virtuousness.
By the same logic, non-virtuousness is that which is presented in scripture and abides in the type of being able to give rise to painful results. However, it is not certain that suffering will arise — it is possible that the causal conditions for producing a painful result may be dismantled by the power of confession before the negative result is experienced.
དགེ་མི་དགེ་གང་རུང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས། ལུང་མ་བསྟན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Dharma that is neither established as virtuousness nor non-virtuousness, is the definition of indeterminacy.
Any dharma that does not satisfy either of the two foregoing definitions — virtuousness or non-virtuousness — belongs to indeterminacy.
དབྱེ་ན། དོན་དམ། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། མཚུངས་ལྡན། ཀུན་སློང་། རྗེས་འབྲེལ་གྱི་དགེ་མི་དགེ་ལུང་མ་བསྟན་ལྔ་ལྔ་ཡོད་དོ། །
Classified as five: virtuousness/non-virtuousness/indeterminacy of ultimate, essential nature, association, motivation, accompanying.
The fivefold sub-classifications of virtuousness and non-virtuousness are made through the “gate of verbal convention”: at least one of the sub-types does not satisfy the definition of virtuousness or non-virtuousness proper, but is designated by convention. The sub-classifications of indeterminacy, on the other hand, are made through the “gate of inherent nature”, since all sub-types genuinely satisfy the definition of indeterminacy.
The specific classifications of virtue and non-virtue are as follows:
Ultimate virtuousness: For example, the cessation truth (nirodha) and non-self are classified as ultimately virtuous, but both are permanent phenomena; they cannot produce results and thus do not satisfy the inner content of virtuousness — “abiding in the type of being able to produce well-being.” Similarly, the physical body of a buddha is supremely excellent, but since it is already a resultant state, it will not produce further happy fruits. Both are therefore classified as virtuousness only by virtue of verbal convention. (This point remains open to further discussion.)
essential nature virtuousness: This is genuinely virtuous in the proper sense. According to the Sautrāntika school and higher, there are eleven essential-nature virtuous mental factors: faith, diligence, mental pliancy, conscientiousness, shame, non-attachment, non-hatred, non-ignorance, non-negligence, non-harmfulness, and equanimity. These mental factors are directly posited in scripture and possess the nature of virtuousness through their own power.
Associative virtuousness: This includes the main mind and the five pervasive mental factors (attention, contact, feeling, discernment, and volition) that arise simultaneously with virtuous mental factors, as well as other mental factors that arise in association that are not among the eleven essential-nature virtuous ones. These all satisfy the definition of virtuousness and are genuinely virtuous.
Motivational virtuousness: Motivation (i.e., the driving intention) is what leads one to create new virtuous physical, verbal, and mental actions. The motivation itself, along with the main mind and mental factors it comprises, all belong to motivational virtuousness and are genuinely virtuous.
Accompanying virtuousness: This refers to virtuous latent tendency. Latent tendencies are of neutral nature inherently, but because the cognition that gave rise to them was virtuous, they are designated as “virtuous” by convention. These tendencies do not themselves possess the nature of being able to produce happy results through their own power, so they are not genuinely virtuous.
The sub-classifications of non-virtuousness follow the same structure. The three types — essential-nature, associative, and motivational non-virtuousness — are genuinely non-virtuous (e.g., essential-nature non-virtuousness includes afflictive mental factors such as aversion). Ultimate non-virtuousness (e.g., samsara itself is of neutral nature and does not through its own power produce suffering) and accompanying non-virtuousness (the latent tendencies of non-virtue, which are neutral) are not genuinely non-virtuous.
Note: The Vaibhāṣika school does not accept accompanying virtuousness or non-virtuousness because it does not accept latent tendencies. For the Vaibhāṣika, genuinely virtuous or non-virtuous phenomena are of four types: ultimate, essential-nature, associative, and motivational.
The five sub-types of indeterminacy:
Ultimate indeterminacy: Permanent phenomena in the general sense are neutral — for example, unconditioned space — since permanent phenomena have no virtuous or non-virtuous attribute inherently.
Essential-nature indeterminacy: Mental factors whose inherent nature is neutral.
Associative indeterminacy: The main mind and mental factors that arise simultaneously with neutral mental factors.
Motivational indeterminacy: A motivation that is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous, arising prior to neutral mental factors.
Accompanying indeterminacy: latent tendencies of virtuous or non-virtuous mental factors — these are accompanying indeterminacy. Indeterminacy can further be subdivided into obscured indeterminacy and unobscured indeterminacy. “Obscured” here refers to an obstruction related to cognition — any phenomenon that constitutes either an afflictive obstruction or a cognitive obstruction is “obscured neutral.” Unobscured indeterminacy includes fruitional effects, which are both indeterminate and free from either the afflictive obstruction or the cognitive obstruction, hence non-obstructive and unobscured. All of the foregoing sub-classifications of indeterminacy are made through the gate of inherent nature and are genuinely neutral.
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བློའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
The common locus of that for which an instance of it exists and that which is suitable to be an object of intellect, is the definition of an instantiable knowable.
A phenomenon is an “instantiable knowable” if it simultaneously satisfies: (a) there exists something that is an instance of it, and (b) it is suitable to be an object of intellect. For example, impermanence is a knowable, and both vases and pillars are instances of impermanence — so impermanence qualifies as an instantiable knowable. It is important to note that “instantiable” here does not refer to whether an instance actually exists, but to whether an instance can be posited. For example, rabbit horns do not actually exist, yet rabbit horns are an instance of the non-permanent. Since the non-permanent is itself a knowable, it satisfies the definition of an instantiable knowable.
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བློའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
The common locus of that for which no instance of it exists and that which is suitable to be an object of intellect. It is the definition of an uninstantiable knowable.
By the same token, a phenomenon for which no instance can be posited, but which is itself a knowable, is called an “uninstantiable knowable.” For example, “the pair of vase and pillar” has no instance of itself — there is nothing that is simultaneously both a vase and a pillar — yet “the pair of vase and pillar” is itself a knowable. Therefore, “the pair of vase and pillar” is an uninstantiable knowable.
སོ་སོ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཆོས། གཅིག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Dharma that is not discrete, is the definition of oneness.
A dharma that is “not discrete” is the definition of oneness. That which is numerically singular is “oneness” — for example, a single vase, a single tree.
སོ་སོ་བའི་ཆོས། ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
Dharma that is discrete, is the definition of distinctiveness.
A dharma that is “discrete” — that is, numerically more than one — is “distinctive.” Even two completely identical vases count as distinctive; two trees are also distinctive; a vase and a pillar are also distinctive.
Important distinction — “being distinctive” vs. “being mutually distinctive”:
For something to qualify as “being distinctive”, the entire expression must fall within the scope of dharma. The rule is: as long as the first item is a dharma, then adding another dharma or non-dharma to form a group of “distinctive” still results in something that is a dharma overall. For example, “the vase and rabbit horns” qualifies as distinctive, whereas “rabbit horns and the vase” does not — because rabbit horns are not a dharma, and the expression does not satisfy the definition of distinctiveness. (This point can be debated further.) “Being mutually distinct,” however, requires both items to be dharma, and the two must remain distinctive even when their order is reversed. For example, “the vase and rabbit horns” is not mutually distinct, because reversing their order — “rabbit horns and the vase” — no longer qualifies as distinctive.
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“Recorded in the sutras” means it was personally spoken by the Buddha himself.
Having the capability to give birth does not necessarily mean it will definitely give birth — in other words, it has the potential to produce, but it may not actually succeed in producing.